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Abstract
Excerpt:: Hornsby’s article is timely because of the current popularity of ethics and “character education.” We
can agree with her that the development of “moral reasoning skills” is a very desirable outcome for an ethics
course. Hornsby, however, does not stick to her stated goal: ”not to change or alter students’ moral positions
but provide them with the tools to reflectively endorse their views and to evaluate the consistency of their
positions.” This would be consistent with the objectives of any philosophy course, but there is an essential
equivocation in Hornsby’s actual discussion about what it is possible or appropriate to teach in such a course.
Her final decision to focus exclusively on virtue ethics also carries with it an implicit endorsement which
subverts the critical stance.
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Hornsby’s article is timely because  of the current popularity of ethics and “character 
education.”  We can agree with her that the development of “moral reasoning skills” 
is a very desirable outcome for an ethics course. Hornsby, however, does not stick to 
her stated goal: ”not to change  or alter students’ moral positions but provide them 
with the tools to reflectively endorse their views  and to evaluate the consistency of 
their positions.” This would  be consistent with the objectives of any philosophy 
course, but there is an essential equivocation in Hornsby’s actual discussion about 
what it is possible  or appropriate to teach in such a course. Her final  decision to 
focus  exclusively on virtue ethics also carries with it an implicit endorsement which 
subverts the critical stance. 
 
Even if we answer the question in the Meno affirmatively, we still must specify  which 
virtues should  be taught. Who is qualified to teach them?   And how  will  we know 
when the desired learning has taken place?   Hornsby tackles the last question using 
empirical tools, but seems  to make  a series of uncritical assumptions related to the 
first two: 
 
• That moral behavior can be taught. 
• That proficiency in moral reasoning will  lead to improvement in moral 
behavior. 
• That it is the task of philosophy and philosophers to give  moral instruction. 
• That we have  defined what constitutes “moral reasoning.” 
• That we have  agreed on what constitutes “moral behavior.” 
• That we have  determined who is qualified to give  instruction in ethical or 
moral behavior. 
• That we have  determined conclusively that the positions, knowledge and 
values  students bring with them are “naïve” and contain “inaccuracies and 
misconceptions.” 
• That there is a universal pattern of ethical development. 
• That no one completes this process of development. 
• That ethical relativism, skepticism, nihilism and religious absolutism represent 
finally discredited points of view  and that (presumably autonomous) 
“universal moral principles” characterize the ethical beliefs  of an “engaged 
citizenry.” 
 
This set of assumptions may  result from a mistake regarding what philosophers 
qua philosophers can and should  do when  they are acting as teachers. For better 
or for worse, the role of the academic philosopher is now  very different from 
what it was in the nineteenth century, the last time when  ethical and moral 
philosophy was such a preeminent concern in American life. Philosophers can no 
longer pretend to acquaintance with absolute or universal ethical truths, nor is 
their inculcation part of the philosophical charge, even  as a matter of pedagogy. 
This is not to defend  ethical relativism or any other position, but merely to 
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acknowledge the evolution of our thinking, under the chastening effect of time 
and events. 
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